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 The idea that an employer may be liable for simply hiring or 
retaining an employee who later causes an injury may seem like a 
nightmare for employers. The threat of potential punitive damages1 for 
an employee’s intentional acts outside the scope of employment may 
cause employers further grief. But this is exactly the kind of liability 
that negligent hiring and negligent retention claims create. While some 
employers may scoff at what may seem like yet another liability, 
various limiting principles help ensure that these torts do not have a 
wide scope. Employers, therefore, do not need to worry that they may 
become “an insurer of the safety of every person who happens to come 
into contact with [an] employee.”2  
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; M.P.A., University of Illinois at Chicago, 2009; B.A., University of 
Rhode Island, 2005. 
1 See, e.g., Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, Inc., 387 N.E.2d 1241 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1979).  
2 Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454, 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
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 Yet, despite these limiting principles, courts may be tempted to 
expand the scope of negligent hiring and retention when faced with 
sympathetic plaintiffs. Negligent hiring and negligent retention claims 
often involve plaintiffs who have been the victims of atrocious crimes 
at the hands of a defendant’s employee. The injuries occur under 
circumstances where ordinary theories of employer liability, such as 
respondeat superior or liability under civil rights statutes, do not 
apply. In such situations, a court may feel justified in pushing the 
boundaries of negligent hiring and retention claims so that the injured 
party can receive some remedy. This tendency, however, may create 
employer liability where traditionally there has been none.  
 As such, it is important for negligent hiring and retention 
claims to have some clear limitations. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts sets out a bright line rule, limiting these claims to intentional 
acts that occur on an employer’s premises or using an employer’s 
chattels.3 This premises/chattel standard has the advantage of creating 
easily defined, clearly recognizable limits on employer liability for 
negligent hiring and retention. However, in practice, mechanical 
application of this standard can lead to seemingly unjust results.  
 The court in Anicich v. Home Depot was faced with one such 
situation. In Anicich, the plaintiff’s daughter was the victim of a brutal 
murder at the hands of a Home Depot employee who was the 
daughter’s supervisor. The murder occurred hundreds of miles from 
where they worked and did not involve any of Home Depot’s 
chattels.4 Yet, the crime seemed inextricably linked to the supervisor’s 
employment. In reversing the district court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s complaint, the Seventh Circuit declined to apply a 
“formalistic adherence” to the Restatement’s premises/chattel 
standard.5 The court instead chose to modify the standard and 
determined that supervisory authority fell within the meaning of 
                                                 
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).  
4 Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2017); 
Michael Tarm, Court restores Plainfield woman's suit accusing Home Depot of 
negligence in daughter's slaying, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 28, 2017).   
5 Id. at 651.  
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chattel.6 In doing so, the court may have avoided an “odd, even 
arbitrary result,”7 but it also may have inadvertently expanded 
negligent hiring and retention beyond traditionally accepted limits. 
What the court characterized as an “incremental shift,”8 may actually 
be an amorphous and wide-reaching standard if fully embraced by 
Illinois courts.  
 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit may have created this 
standard unnecessarily. Illinois courts have never strictly adhered to 
the Restatement’s premises/chattel standard. Instead, they have used it 
as a guidepost along with other tort theories of foreseeability and 
proximate cause. If the Anicich court had simply applied a broad 
interpretation of foreseeability to the case, it could have reached the 
same result without modifying the Restatement’s standard. Thus, the 
court could have made a true “incremental shift” instead of creating a 
new, amorphous standard.              
 To put the Anicich court’s decision in context, Part I of this 
article discusses the elements of negligent hiring and negligent 
retention claims as well as the scope of employer liability under these 
torts. In Part II, the article then exams how the Seventh Circuit applied 
Illinois case law in Anicich v. Home Depot.  That Part also discusses 
how the court formulated a novel interpretation of the Restatement’s 
premises/chattel standard. In Part III, this article examines how Illinois 
courts have traditionally applied negligent hiring standards and how 
the Anicich court’s approach differed from those standards. Finally, in 
Part IV, the article examines the broad purpose of negligent hiring and 
retention claims and comments on how the Anicich court may have 
extended their scope. That Part also examines alternative approaches 
the Anicich court could have taken to reach the same result without 
significantly expanding traditional negligent hiring and retention 
claims.     
 
                                                 
6 Id.   
7 Id.  
8 Id. at 654.  
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I. WHAT ARE NEGLIGENT HIRING AND NEGLIGENT RETENTION 
CLAIMS? 
 
 The torts of negligent hiring and negligent retention hold 
employers liable for the intentional actions of their employees which 
occur outside the scope of employment and which have some 
connection to the employment relationship. Under negligent hiring and 
retention, the employer is directly liable for negligence because the 
employer should have known that its employee was a danger to 
others.9 These claims are distinct from respondeat superior claims, 
which focus on the tortious acts of the employee acting within the 
scope of employment.  
 Under the familiar doctrine of respondeat superior, an 
employer is “subject to the liability for the torts of his servants 
committed while acting in the scope of their employment.”10 Tortious 
acts of employees are effectively imputed to the employer so long as 
the employee is acting within the scope of his employment.11 While 
there is no precise definition for “scope of employment,” the definition 
broadly includes conduct by the employee if: “(a) it is of the kind he is 
employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized 
time and space limits; [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a 
purpose to serve the master.”12 For liability to attach to the employer, 
the burden is on the plaintiff to show a “contemporaneous relationship 
between the tortious act and scope of employment.”13    
 While respondeat superior focuses on the tortious conduct of 
the employee, negligent hiring and negligent retention are grounded in 
the idea that the employer itself is negligent. Unlike respondeat 
superior, it is the employer’s own negligence that is the proximate 
                                                 
9 Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898, 905 (Ill. 1999). 
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958); see, e.g., Pyne v. 
Witmer, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (Ill. 1989).     
11 See Tatham v. Wabash R. Co., 107 N.E.2d 735, 735-36 (Ill. 1952); Pyne, 
543 N.E.2d at 1308.  
12 Pyne, 543. N.E.2d at 1308 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 
228 (1958)).  
13 Id. at 1309.  
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cause of the plaintiff’s injury.14 Also unlike respondeat superior, 
liability extends to employee actions that occur outside the scope of 
employment.15   
  
A. Elements of Negligent Hiring and Negligent Retention 
 
 Illinois recognizes a duty for employers to act reasonably in 
hiring, supervising, and retaining their employees.16 This duty holds 
an employer liable when it knew, or should have known, that an 
employee was “unfit for the job so as to create a danger of harm to 
third persons.”17 In Illinois, the elements of negligent hiring and 
negligent retention are:  
 
(1) that the employer knew or should have known that the 
employee had a particular unfitness for the position so as to 
create a danger of harm to third persons; (2) that such 
particular unfitness was known or should have been known at 
the time of the employee's hiring or retention; and (3) that 
this particular unfitness proximately caused the plaintiff's 
injury.18 
 
While use of the terms negligent hiring, negligent retention, and 
negligent supervision suggest three separate torts, Illinois courts do not 
make significant distinctions between the three, and all three generally 
follow this same analysis.19 
                                                 
14 Van Horne, 705 N.E.2d at 905.  
15 Carter v. Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 628 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1993). 
16 Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. 852 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2017); Van 
Horne, 705 N.E.2d at 904.  
17 Van Horne, 705 N.E.2d at 904.  
18 Id. 
19 Zahl v. Krupa, 927 N.E.2d 262, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (citing Van Horne, 
705 N.E.2d at 904).  
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 Under the first element, the employee must have a “particular 
unfitness” that gives rise to a danger of harm to third parties.20 While 
this is a seemingly broad standard, particular unfitness typically only 
encompasses behaviors that exhibit violent or criminal tendencies. 
Illinois courts have not found non-threatening qualities, such as a 
physical impairment or learning defect, as forms of a particular 
unfitness for purposes of negligent hiring or retention. Some examples 
of a particular unfitness include a reputation or propensity for 
violence,21 moral turpitude that poses a danger to minors,22 and 
harassing behavior towards subordinates.23  
 It is not enough for the employee to simply have a particular 
unfitness. The employer must know or should know of the employee’s 
particular unfitness.24 Often, courts will look to see if an employer 
should have conducted a background check and whether that 
background check would have discovered an employee’s particular 
unfitness.25 However, having actual notice of the particular unfitness 
will satisfy this element.26  
 Finally, plaintiffs must show that there is a causal connection 
between the plaintiff’s injuries and the fact of employment.27  This 
proximate cause element limits employer liability only to situations 
                                                 
20 Van Horne, 705 N.E.2d at 905.   
21 Gregor by Gregor v. Kleiser 443 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).  
22 Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1997).  
23 Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2017). 
24 Van Horne, 702 N.E.2d at 905. 
25 See, e.g,, Mueller 678 N.E.2d at 664 (criminal background check would have 
revealed danger to children); Strickland v. Communications and Cable of Chicago, 
Inc., 710 N.E.2d 55, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (even if company had performed a 
background check, it would not uncovered a negative employment history or 
significant criminal record).  
26 See, e.g., Tatham v. Wabash R. Co., 107 N.E.2d 735, 735 (Ill. 1952) 
(employers knew an employee was a “vicious, contentious, pugnacious and ill-
tempered person” at time of hiring); Gregor, 443 N.E.2d at 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) 
(defendants knew the man they hired as a bouncer had extraordinary physical 
strength and “vicious propensities for violence”).  
27 Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454, 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
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where the plaintiff’s injuries are “brought by reason of employment of 
the unfit employee.”28 To determine proximate cause, “it is necessary 
to inquire whether the injury occurred by virtue of the servant’s 
employment.”29 The proximate cause requirement protects employers 
from becoming “an insurer of the safety of every person who happens 
to come into contact with his employee simply because of his status as 
an employee.”30  
 Many (if not most) negligent hiring and retention claims fail at 
the proximate cause element.31 Illinois courts have applied a “rigorous 
standard” for the proximate cause requirement.32 Courts require that 
the “employment itself must create the situation where the employee’s 
violent propensities harm the third person.”33 While the existence of 
proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury, a 
defendant may be entitled to summary judgment if the evidence is 
insufficient to establish an employer’s negligence as the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.34    
 The proximate cause element requires some foreseeability to 
the employer. It is satisfied when “the employee's particular unfitness 
‘rendered the plaintiff's injury foreseeable to a person of ordinary 
prudence in the employer's position.’”35 The foreseeability standard in 
                                                 
28 Carter v. Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 628 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1993). 
29 Bates, 502 N.E.2d at 459. 
30 Id. 
31 See, e.g., Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898 (Ill. 1999); Doe v. Boy 
Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. 
Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Carter, 628 N.E.2d 602; and 
Bates, 502 N.E.2d 453. 
32 Doe v. Boy Scouts, 4 N.E.3d at 561.  
33 Carter 628 N.E.2d at 604. 
34 Id. 
35 Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Platson v. NSM, America, Inc., 748 N.E.2d 1278, 1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001)). 
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negligent hiring and retention is similar to the standard in other torts.36 
Defendants do not need to foresee the exact harm or injury, but rather 
reasonably foresee that some harm could occur.37 
 
B. Limiting Principles 
 
 One could imagine that extending employer liability to 
employee actions outside the scope of employment could expose 
employers to a wide range of claims. However, Illinois courts have 
imposed a number of limiting principles on negligent hiring and 
retention claims to prevent this. First, courts have generally limited 
these claims to cases where the employee is on the employer's 
premises or using an employer chattel at the time of injury.38 This 
follows the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 317.39 This rule helps to limit the employer’s liability to cases 
where the injury happened “by virtue of the [tortfeasor’s] 
employment,” rather than simply where “the tortfeasor and the victim 
knew each other through work.”40In addition, while perhaps not 
required, negligent hiring and retention claims typically involve some 
form of physical injury to the plaintiff’s person or property.41  
 Another limit is that certain causes of action foreclose claims 
of employer negligence. For example, employers who are found to 
have respondeat superior liability cannot also be sued under negligent 
hiring.42 Thus, injuries that arise from an employee acting within the 
                                                 
36 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) (1965) (“If the actor's conduct is 
a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither 
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it 
occurred does not prevent him from being liable.”). 
37 Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc., 15 N.E.3d 545, 552 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2014).   
38 See Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2014);Escobar v. Madsen Const. Co., 589 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).  
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965). 
40 Anicich, 852 F.3d at 650.  
41 Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898, 905 (Ill. 1999). 
42 Gant v. L.U. Transport Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).  
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scope of his duties will typically fall under respondeat superior rather 
than negligent hiring or retention.    
 In addition, negligent hiring and retention claims may be 
preempted by state statutes governing civil rights violations. 43 The 
Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA) prohibits employment 
discrimination based on sex, age, race, color, religion, arrest record, 
marital status, sexual orientation, physical and mental disability, 
citizenship status, national origin, ancestry, unfavorable military 
discharge, military status, sexual harassment, and orders of 
protection.44 Illinois courts have found that tort claims are preempted 
by the IHRA when the underlying tort is “inextricably linked to a civil 
rights violation such that there is no independent basis for the action 
apart from the Human Rights Act itself.”45 Thus, an injury that results 
from discrimination against a protected category would be preempted 
by the IHRA.   
 Finally, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act’s (IWCA) 
exclusivity provision bars common law claims for accidental injuries 
that occur during the course of employment.46 The Act provides 
exceptions to this provision if “(1) the injury was not accidental; (2) 
the injury did not arise from [the employee’s] employment; (3) the 
injury was not received during the course of [the employee’s] 
employment; or (4) the injury was not compensable under the Act.”47 
Even with these exceptions, many potential negligent hiring and 
                                                 
43 See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1997).   
44 775 ILCS 5/2-102; 775 ILCS 5/2-103.   
45 Welch v. Illinois Supreme Court, 751 N.E.2d 1187, 1196 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001); see also Gaughan v. Crawford, 2009 WL 631983 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (dismissing 
a negligent hiring and retention claim because it was so inextricably linked to an 
underlying sexual harassment claim and thus barred by the Illinois Human Rights 
Act).  
46 820 ILCS 305/5(a). 
47 Meerbrey v. Marshall Field and Co., Inc., 564 N.E.2d 1222, 1226 (Ill. 1990).  
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retention claims are likely to be preempted by the IWCA’s exclusivity 
provisions.48      
 Thus, negligent hiring and retention claims only apply in a 
relatively narrow set of circumstances where the employee is acting 
outside the scope of his employment, there is some connection to the 
employment relationship, and civil rights or workers’ compensation 
statutes do not otherwise preempt the claims.  
 
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF NEGLIGENT HIRING AND 
RETENTION STANDARDS  
  
 In a factually gruesome case, the Seventh Circuit stretched 
Illinois’s negligent hiring and retention standards beyond their usual 
limits. Though the court labeled the plaintiff’s story “all too 
familiar,”49 the horrific nature of events that transpired perhaps led the 
court to allow a negligence claim where others may have failed. 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
 The facts of Anicich are ghastly. Brian Cooper was the regional 
manager for the defendant-employers, Home Depot U.SA., Inc., Grand 
Service, LLC, and Grand Flower Growers, Inc.50 Cooper had a history 
of sexually harassing his female subordinates.51 A prior female 
employee had complained of Cooper making comments about his 
genitals to her and of Cooper rubbing himself against her.52 Cooper 
became increasingly loud and abusive with her, ultimately leading her 
to quit.53     
                                                 
48 See, e.g., Walker v. Doctors Hospital of Hyde Park, 110 F.Supp.2d 704 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (barring a negligent retention claim when the plaintiff’s injury arose 
from a co-worker’s assault).   
49 Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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 Sometime after this, Alisha Bromfield began working at one of 
the Home Depots that Cooper managed.54 She was only a teenager 
when she began working at the store in 2006.55 Shortly after she 
started, Cooper exhibited similar behaviors towards Bromfield as he 
had with the prior female employee.56 He called Bromfield his 
girlfriend, swore and yelled at her, called her names like “bitch,” 
“slut,” and “whore” in front customers, and slammed things around 
her.57 As time went on, Cooper became increasingly controlling, 
monitoring Bromfield’s lunches, texting her outside of work, and 
pressuring her to spend time alone with him.58 He even required that 
she accompany him on business trips, one time insisting that they 
share a hotel room.59 
 This pattern of abuse culminated when Cooper pressured 
Bromfield to accompany him to his sister’s wedding in Wisconsin.60 
After Bromfield initially refused, Cooper compelled her to go by 
threatening to either fire her or reduce her hours.61 At their hotel room 
after the wedding, Cooper demanded that Bromfield enter into a 
relationship with him.62 When Bromfield refused, Cooper strangled 
Broomfield, killing her and her seven-month old fetus.63 He then 
proceeded to rape her corpse.64 
 Prior to this crime, multiple senior managers at Home Depot 
were aware of Cooper’s behavior towards Bromfield and other female 
employees.65 Bromfield had complained repeatedly about Cooper to 












65 Id. at 647.  
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other supervisors and managers, and told her group leader that she did 
not want to be left alone with him.66 One time, Cooper was sent home 
after he called Bromfield a “slut” and “whore” in front of customers.67 
Cooper was subsequently ordered to take anger management classes, 
though the defendant-employer never followed up to see that he did 
so.68 Despite the fact that senior management was aware of Cooper’s 
behavior, Cooper remained Bromfield’s supervisor until her death.69 
  
B. How the Seventh Circuit Applied Illinois Negligent Hiring and 
Retention Standards  
 
 Perhaps tacitly acknowledging that they were aware of 
Cooper’s particular unfitness, the defendants focused their defense on 
duty and proximate causation. The defendants argued that they should 
not be liable under negligent hiring and retention theories because: (1) 
allowing the case to go forward would create “new and unjustifiable 
burdens for employers”; (2) these claims only apply “when the 
employee is on the employer’s premises or using the employer’s 
chattel”; and (3) Bromfield’s injury “was not foreseeable to a person 
of ordinary prudence in the employer’s position.”70 
 The court first turned its attention to whether the defendants 
had a duty to fire or demote employees because of their “usage of 
inappropriate language, or sexual misconduct.”71 The defendants 
claimed that such an obligation, and the resulting burdens, would be 
intolerable.72 However, the court noted that defendants already had 
these obligations under existing sexual harassment and sexual 
discrimination law. 73  Citing a string of sexual harassment cases 




69 Id. at 647-48.  
70 Id .at 649.  
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 649-50.  
73 Id. at 650.  
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where employers were vicariously liable for failing to prevent and 
correct sexual harassment, the court reasoned that applying these 
principles to tort law would not impose any new obligations on 
employers.74 
 The court next turned to the thorny issue of whether liability 
would extend to Cooper’s actions which occurred off the employer’s 
premises and which did not involve the employer’s chattels. The rule 
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Illinois Supreme 
Court has cited in negligence claims,75 states that a master may be 
liable for the tortious conduct of its servants while acting outside the 
scope of his employment if:  
 
(a) the servant 
 (i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or 
 upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his 
 servant, or 
 (ii) is using a chattel of the master, and 
(b) the master 
 (i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to 
 control his servant, and 
 (ii) knows or should know of the necessity and 
 opportunity for exercising such control.76  
 
 In this case, Cooper murdered Bromfield while off duty, in a 
different state, after attending his sister’s wedding.77 Could the 
Restatement’s rule be extended to such actions?  
 The court first noted that the purpose of the rule was to limit 
the employer’s liability to injuries that “occurred by virtue of the 
                                                 
74 Id.   
75 See Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass’n, 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1178-79 (Ill. 
2001).  
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).  
77 Anicich, 852 F.3d at 649.  
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servant’s employment.”78 In particular, the rule seeks to “avoid 
holding an employer liable simply because the tortfeasor and the 
victim knew each other through work.”79 Here, the court reasoned, 
Cooper did use something given to him by virtue of his employment: 
his supervisory authority over Bromfield.80  
 While not a chattel in the traditional sense, Cooper’s 
supervisory authority is analogous.81 Refusing to apply “[f]ormalistic 
adherence to the literal terms of § 317(a) [of the Restatement of 
Torts],”82 the court found “no principled reason to hold employers 
liable for the tortious abuse of their chattels but not for the tortious 
abuse of supervisory authority.”83 In effect, chattels and supervisory 
authority are both tools which the employer entrusts to the employee, 
both of which can enable tortious conduct, and both of which require 
monitoring by the employer.84 Injuries resulting from an abuse of 
supervisory authority do indeed occur “by virtue of the [tortfeasor’s] 
employment, and not because the tortfeasor and victim merely know 
each other through their work.”85  
 The court did not characterize this analogy between chattels 
and supervisory authority as a significant extension of tort liability. 
Rather, it relied on the Restatement (Second) of Agency to show that 
employer liability for an employee’s misuse of authority is, in fact, an 
established principle in law.86 Acknowledging that the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency generally limits liability only to when the servant 
is acting within the scope of employment or purporting to act on the 
                                                 
78 Id. 650 (quoting Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550, 561 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2014)).  
79 Id. 




84 Id. at 652.  
85 Id. (quoting Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2014)).  
86 Id.  
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principal’s behalf,87 the court nonetheless found that employer liability 
can extend to intentional torts committed outside the scope of 
employment when a supervisory employee is abusing his authority.88  
 In drawing this conclusion, the court relied on the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth which extended an employer’s vicarious liability under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One of the issues in Ellerth was 
“whether an employer has vicarious liability when a supervisor… 
mak[es] explicit threats to alter a subordinate's terms or conditions of 
employment… but does not fulfill the threat.”89 Relying, in part, on 
Section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency,90 the 
Supreme Court held that an employer could indeed be vicariously 
liable for harm caused by the misuse of supervisory authority even 
when no tangible employment action is taken, subject to an affirmative 
defense.91  
 The Restatement of Employment Law adopted this same 
position for causes of action beyond Title VII. Section 4.03 states that 
“an employer is subject to liability in tort to an employee for harm 
caused in the course of employment… by the tortious abuse or 
threatened abuse of a supervisory or managerial employee’s 
authority… even if the abuse or threatened abuse is not within the 
scope of employment.”92  
 When Cooper threatened to cut Bromfield’s hours or fire her if 
she did not accompany him to his sister’s wedding, he abused his 
supervisory authority, even though he did not carry out his threats.93 
                                                 
87 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)).  
88 Id. 
89 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). 
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958). (“(2) A master is 
not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their 
employment, unless: (d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the 
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”).   
91 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65 (1998).  
92 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03 (2015).  
93 Anicich, 852 F.3d at 653. 
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These were precisely the kinds of threats that the Court in Ellerth and 
that the Restatement of Employment Law sought to address.94 Holding 
that the defendants could be liable for Cooper’s actions was not, the 
court reasoned, a radical departure from traditional principles of 
vicarious liability, but merely an “incremental shift.”95   
 Finally, the court turned its attention to the foreseeability of the 
plaintiff’s injury. The issue was whether Cooper’s “harassing, 
controlling, and aggressive behavior toward his female subordinates,” 
would have rendered Bromfield’s injury foreseeable to a person of 
ordinary prudence.96 The defendants focused on the fact that Cooper’s 
actions were a “radical break from even his most offensive prior 
behavior” and that no reasonable employer could have predicted 
violence since Cooper had never made explicit threats to hit anyone.97 
However, the court noted that it is not necessary to foresee “the 
precise nature of the harm or the exact manner of occurrence; it is 
sufficient if, at the time of the defendant’s action or inaction, some 
harm could have been reasonably foreseen.”98 Emphasizing that this 
question is a matter of fact, the court concluded, based on the 
complaint’s detailed allegations of Cooper’s escalating threats, that a 
reasonable jury could “easily find that the employers could and should 
have foreseen that Cooper would take the small further step to 
violence.”99  
 
III. BROADENING THE SCOPE OF NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION? 
 
 Because this case turned on state tort law, the Seventh Circuit 
had to follow Illinois state law, primarily by relying on decisions of 
                                                 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 654.  
97 Id. 
98 Id. (quoting Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, 15 N.E.3d 545, 552 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2014).  
99 Id. at 655.  
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the Illinois Supreme Court.100 Finding no other Illinois case “directly 
on point,” the court was left to determine how the Illinois Supreme 
Court would have ruled with these particularly disturbing facts.101 But 
does Illinois case law support this ruling on negligent hiring and 
retention? Was the Seventh Circuit accurate in its prediction that the 
Illinois Supreme Court would have moved in this direction?102 The 
somewhat uneven application of negligent hiring and retention 
standards makes this a difficult assessment.  
 Again, the defense in this case relied on three main arguments: 
(1) that they had no duty to fire or demote Cooper because of his 
behavior; (2) that negligent hiring only applies “when the employee is 
on the employer’s premises or using the employer’s chattel”; and (3) 
that  Bromfield’s injury was not foreseeable.103 While the Seventh 
Circuit may have found strong support in Illinois case law  for its 
conclusions on duty and foreseeability, its extension of employer 
negligence in a case off the employer’s premises and not using the 
employer’s chattels is much more tenuous.   
 
A. Duty Cases 
 
 Illinois has long recognized that employers have a duty to 
refrain from hiring or retaining employees who pose a harm to third 
parties. In a 1952 case, Tatham v. Wabash, the Illinois Supreme Court 
explicitly recognized that an employer could be held liable for a 
negligent breach of duty even for intentional or criminal misconduct 
by one of its employees.104 In Tatham, the plaintiff was severely 
beaten by the defendant’s employee, Davis, a “vicious, contentious, 
pugnacious and ill-tempered person who was quarrelsome and 
frequently engaged in physical combats.”105 The plaintiff’s complaint 
                                                 
100 Id. at 648-49.  
101 Id. at 648.  
102 Id. at 653. 
103 Id. at 649.  
104 Tatham v. Wabash, 107 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ill. 1952).  
105 Id. at 735.  
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alleged that the defendant was aware of Davis’ “vicious and dangerous 
character.”106 Reversing a lower court’s dismissal, the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that when an employer is aware of “conditions 
creating a likelihood of injury,” the employer has a “duty to make 
reasonable provision against a foreseeable danger involving the 
intentional misconduct of a third person.”107 
 Illinois courts have consistently recognized this duty. In Bates 
v. Doria, for example, an off-duty county sheriff attacked and raped a 
woman who was walking her dog in a public park.108 Even though the 
sheriff acted outside the scope of his employment, the court explicitly 
recognized that an employer has a “duty to refrain from hiring or 
retaining an employee who is a threat to third persons to whom the 
employee is exposed.”109 In Kigin v. Woodmen, a mother brought 
claim on behalf of her daughter who was molested by a camp 
counselor.110 Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 317, 
the court found the camp had a duty to exercise reasonable care and 
control over the counselor even though the counselor was acting 
outside the scope of his employment.111 Though acting outside the 
scope of his employment, the court paid particular attention to the fact 
that the counsellor committed the crime on the camp grounds and 
while acting in a supervisory capacity.112  
 In Anicich, the Seventh Circuit also recognized this duty, albeit 
with a slightly different rationale. Home Depot argued that imposing a 
duty in this case would create an obligation for employers to fire or 
demote employees simply because of the use of inappropriate 
language or sexual misconduct.113 Rather than pointing to tort cases 
                                                 
106 Id. at 739.  
107 Id. at 739-40.  
108 Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).  
109 See id. (summary judgment for the defendants upheld on other grounds).   
110 Kigin v. Woodmen of the World Ins. Co., 541 N.E.2d 735, 735 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1989).  
111 Id. at 736.  
112 Id. at 736-37.   
113 Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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that recognize a general duty for employers to refrain from hiring or 
retaining employees who are threats to third persons, the Seventh 
Circuit pointed to sexual harassment cases to find that Home Depot 
had a duty “even independent of Illinois tort law.”114 The court did not 
impose any new obligations on employers, but simply decided that 
employer duties under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Illinois 
Human Rights Act also applied to tort law.115  
 
B. Foreseeability Cases 
 
 Interestingly, the 7th Circuit did not rely on negligent hiring or 
retention cases for its foreseeability analysis. Rather, the court relied 
on traditional tort theories of foreseeability.116 While Cooper’s actions 
were a “radical break” from his prior behavior, this was not enough to 
destroy foreseeability.117 Quoting a wrongful death case, the court 
found that it was sufficient that Home Depot was aware that that 
“some harm could have been reasonably foreseen.”118 Though this 
analysis was based on general Illinois tort law, it is in line with the 
foreseeability analysis usually employed in negligent hiring and 
retention cases.   
 In Gregor v. Kleiser, for example, the defendants hired a 
bouncer for a house party for approximately 200 teenagers.119 The 
bouncer struck and seriously injured the plaintiff.120 The defendants’ 
knowledge of the bouncer’s “vicious propensity for physical violence 
upon others, as well as his body building and weight lifting 
achievements and extraordinary strength” was sufficient for the 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 654.  
117 Id. at 654-55.  
118 Id. at 654 (quoting Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc., 15 
N.E.3d 545, 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)).  
119 Gregor by Gregor v. Kleiser, 443 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). 
120 Id. at 1166.  
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plaintiffs to state a claim for negligent hiring.121 In fact, the court 
found that this supported a theory of “reckless or willful and wanton 
conduct” in the hiring of the bouncer.122 
 In Mueller v. Community Consolidated School District 54, a 
wrestling coach molested a student after offering to drive her home.123 
Had the school conducted a background check, they would have 
discovered a “criminal background exhibiting moral turpitude which 
made him unfit for a position dealing with minors,”124  The defendants 
argued that this investigation would not have revealed that the coach 
was unfit for his job or that it would have rendered the plaintiff’s 
injury foreseeable.125 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that 
the coach’s unfitness for the job was not in question, but rather that he 
had some unfitness that made it inappropriate for him to be alone with 
minors.126  
 The Anicich court cited a negligent supervision case which 
followed a similar rationale. In Platson v. NSM America, Inc., a 16-
year-old plaintiff’s supervisor repeatedly touched the plaintiff, rubbed 
her shoulders, and rubbed himself up against her.127 He engaged in 
this conduct “in full view of supervisors and other employees.”128 This 
culminated in an episode where the supervisor blocked the plaintiff in 
her office, grabbed her by the waist, pressed himself against her, and 
tried to force himself on her.129 Though the plaintiff never made any 
complaints, the supervisor’s prior conduct permitted the reasonable 
                                                 
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
123 Mueller v. Community Consolidated School District 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 
662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).  
124 Id. at 664.  
125 Id.  
126 Id. 
127 Platson v. NSM, America, Inc., 748 N.E.2d 1278, 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
128 Id. at 1285. 
129 Id. at 1282.   
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inference that the defendants should have known the supervisor “was 
capable of worse if left alone with plaintiff.”130  
 In negligent hiring cases, courts typically find that injuries are 
not foreseeable when the employer would not have turned up any 
evidence of past violent behavior even if the employer had done a 
reasonable investigation. For example, in Strickland v. 
Communications and Cable of Chicago, a cable company failed to do 
a background check on one of its home-installation subcontractors 
who, while on duty, entered a customer’s apartment and raped her at 
gunpoint.131 However, the plaintiffs could not show that company 
would have discovered information warning them of the 
subcontractors’ violent behavior  even if it had conducted a 
background check.132 Had the company conducted a background 
check, it would have discovered nothing more than traffic offenses.133 
This was insufficient to put the defendants on notice that the 
subcontractor could potentially be a danger to customers.134 
 As another example, in Montgomery v. Petty Management 
Corporation,  a 72-year-old plaintiff got into a fistfight with an off-
duty McDonald’s cook inside the restaurant.135  The plaintiff pointed 
to the cook’s prior gang affiliation and an arrest record for loitering as 
evidence showing that the cook would be a danger to the public.136 
However, the Illinois Appellate Court found this information 
insufficient to put the employer on notice that the cook, who worked 
primarily in the kitchen, could be a potential danger to customers.137  
                                                 
130 Id. at 1285. 
131 Strickland v. Communications and Cable of Chicago, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 55, 
58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
132 Id.   
133 Id. at 57. 
134 Id. at 58.  
135 Montgomery v. Petty Mgmt. Corp., 752 N.E.2d 596, 597-98 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001). 
136 Id. at 600. 
137 Id. at 601.  
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 Strickland and Montgomery differ from Anicich, where the 
plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the employer had actual notice of 
Cooper’s violent and aggressive behavior.138 As in Platson, Cooper’s 
behavior was in full view of other supervisors and employees.139 
Whatever Home Depot may have discovered on a background check 
was irrelevant when faced with the fact that its senior management had 
actual notice of Cooper’s increasingly abusive behavior towards 
Bromfield.140  
 
C. Illinois’ Application of the Restatement’s Premises/Chattel 
Requirement 
  
 While the Anicich court’s analysis of duty and foreseeability 
was in line with other Illinois negligent hiring and retention cases, its 
break from the premises/chattel requirement of the Restatement of 
Torts is not entirely supported by Illinois case law. In fact, the court 
acknowledged that it was just predicting that the Illinois Supreme 
Court would have agreed with its interpretation.141 However, no other 
Illinois case has extended negligent hiring or retention liability where 
the plaintiff’s injury neither happened on the employer’s premises nor 
with the employer chattels. At the same time, though, the Illinois 
Supreme Court has never explicitly held that negligent hiring and 
retention claims should be limited in this way.       
 The premises/chattel requirement of the Restatement of Torts 
is part of the proximate cause analysis for negligent hiring and 
retention.142  Illinois courts have followed two lines of reasoning for 
proximate causation in negligent hiring and retention cases. They have 
either stuck to the premises/chattel requirement of the Restatement of 
                                                 
138 Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2017).  
139 Id. at 647. 
140 Id.  
141 Id. at 651.  
142 See Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); 
Escobar v. Madsen Const. Co., 589 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).  
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Tort,.143 or they have used a broader standard to see if the plaintiff’s 
injury happened by “virtue of the servant’s employment.”144  
 Escobar v. Madsen Const. Co. explicitly rejected a negligent 
hiring claim when a hostile, drug-abusing employee shot a coworker 
off the employer’s premises and not using an employer’s chattels.145 
There, the Illinois Appellate Court reasoned that the employee’s drug 
abuse, threats, and general “orneriness” were not enough to make the 
coworker’s injury foreseeable and establish proximate cause for the 
injury.146 Instead, the court noted that the employee was not on the 
employer’s job site, not doing the employer’s work, and not using the 
employer’s gun.147 The plaintiff therefore could not present sufficient 
evidence to establish a negligent hiring claim.148 
 Doe v. Boy Scouts was even stricter in following the 
Restatement’s premises/chattel requirement. In Doe, a Boy Scouts 
executive sexually assaulted the plaintiff’s son after the executive’s 
employment had been voluntarily terminated.149 The court noted that 
there was little support for extending negligent hiring and retention to 
post-termination acts.150 It also pointed to a “rigorous standard of 
proximate causation” in which liability “will rest only where the 
employee is on the employer's premises or using the chattel of the 
employer.”151 
 Other cases, however, have been less rigorous. In Carter v. 
Skokie Valley, an off-duty security guard kidnapped, raped, and 
                                                 
143 See, e.g., Escobar, 589 N.E.2d.  
144 See, e.g., Carter v. Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 628 N.E.2d 602, 
604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
145 Escobar, 589 N.E.2d at 639-40.  
146 Id. at 640. 
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
149 Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
150 Id. at 561.  
151 Id. at 561 (internal quotations omitted).  
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murdered a woman he knew through work.152 There, the Illinois 
Appellate Court did not rely on the premises/chattel requirement of the 
Restatement, but rather examined whether the plaintiff’s injury was 
caused “by virtue of the servant’s employment.”153 This requires that 
the “employment itself must create the situation where the employee’s 
violent propensities harm the third person.”154 However, the court still 
found that the plaintiff could not establish proximate causation for 
conduct of the off-duty guard.155   
 Bates v. Doria followed the same “virtue of employment” 
standard.156 There, an off-duty sheriff wearing army fatigues, shot a 
passerby with a stun gun, accused her of trespassing on army property, 
and took her to the woods to rape her at gunpoint.157 While not 
expressly following the Restatement, the court noted that the sheriff 
was “not on duty, not issued departmental weapons or uniform, nor 
engaged in conducting any of his duties as a sheriff's deputy.”158 Even 
with the looser standard, the court could not find “some connection 
between the plaintiff’s injuries and the fact of employment.”159 There, 
too, the plaintiff’s claim failed the proximate cause element.160 
 Thus, while the Seventh Circuit was in line with Illinois case 
law for its holdings on duty and foreseeability, it strayed from Illinois 
doctrines on proximate causation. Although Illinois courts do not 
strictly follow the premises/chattel requirement of the Restatement, 
they do apply a fairly rigorous standard to proximate causation. The 
Seventh Circuit seems to have loosened that standard a bit.  
 
                                                 
152 Carter v. Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 628 N.E.2d 602, 602 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1993). 
153 Id. at 604.  
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 605-06.  
156 Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454, 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
157 Id. at 455-56.  
158 Id. at 459.  
159 Id. 
160 Id.  
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IV. COMMENTARY  
 
 Negligent hiring and retention claims can provide a remedy to 
people injured by employees whom employers should have known 
were dangerous. These torts fill a gap when other employment-related 
claims, such as respondeat superior or civil rights violations, do not 
apply.161 Thus, employers are not just responsible for injuries caused 
by employees acting within the scope of employment or for injuries 
inflicted on protected classes of people. Instead, they are generally 
responsible for ensuring that their employees do not pose a danger to 
the public at large, even if the employee is acting intentionally. As the 
Illinois Supreme Court in Tatham noted, when an employer is aware 
of “conditions creating a likelihood of injury, he has a duty to make 
provisions against this foreseeable danger, even though the threatened 
hazard is from the intentional misconduct of third persons.”162  
 These torts can incentivize employers to be vigilant in the 
hiring and retaining of their employees. At the same time, they expose 
employers to liabilities that may cause some reluctance in hiring, 
particularly for high-risk employees. Courts face the difficult task of 
striking a proper balance between these competing interests. The 
Seventh Circuit attempted to strike that balance by modifying the 
Restatement’s premises/chattel requirement. However, the court 
probably could have accomplished the same goal without significantly 
modifying existing law.   
 
A. Background and Purpose of Negligent Hiring and Negligent 
Retention  
   
  In the negligent hiring context, many courts have imposed 
special duties on employers when their jobs involve a special risk to 
                                                 
161 See, e.g., Gant v. L.U. Transport Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002); Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1997).     
162 Tatham v. Wabash R. Co., 107 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ill. 1952) (emphasis 
added).  
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third parties.163 This typically involves a duty to perform a background 
investigation. For example, courts have found heightened duties to 
investigate for jobs that have a special duty to the public (such as taxi 
drivers), when there is a landlord-tenant relationship, or when an 
instrumentality of employment creates an opportunity for tortious 
conduct (such as cable installers who are required to enter customers’ 
homes).164  
 In Illinois, an employer’s duty does not vanish if the job in 
question does not fit into one of these special categories. Indeed, in 
Anicich, Cooper was an ordinary regional manager165 whose position 
presumably did not pose a special danger to third parties.  Even in 
positions that pose no special danger to the public, Illinois still 
consider the results or potential results of background 
investigations.166 Often, these cases turn on whether the employer 
discovered or would have discovered information showing that its 
employee posed a special danger to third parties.167    
 Despite the fact that courts consider what employers would 
have found had they done a background check, Illinois does not 
impose any general requirement for employers to conduct background 
checks except for certain statutorily defined classes of workers.168 In 
fact, many Illinois laws limit the use of information obtained from 
background checks for hiring decisions. For example, the Illinois 
                                                 
163 Michael Silver, Negligent Hiring Claims Take Off, 73-May A.B.A. J. 72, 
74-76 (1987) (discussing various cases where courts have found a heightened duty to 
investigate).   
164 Id.   
165 Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2017).  
166 See, e.g., Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898 (Ill. 1999) (considering the 
past conduct of a radio DJ); Montgomery v. Petty Mgmt. Corp., 752 N.E.2d 596 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2001) (considering the background investigation of a McDonald’s cook).  
167 See, e.g., Van Honre, 705 N.E.2dat 906; Montgomery, 752 N.E.2d at 600-
01; Strickland v. Communications and Cable of Chicago, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 55, 58 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999); and Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 
664 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
168 See, e.g., Illinois Health Care Worker Background Check Act, 225 ILCS 
46.  
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Human Rights Act prohibits employers from using “the fact of an 
arrest or criminal history record information ordered expunged, sealed 
or impounded” in its employment decisions.169 Similarly, under the 
Job Opportunities for Qualified Applicants Act, employers may not 
“inquire about or into, consider, or require disclosure of the criminal 
record or criminal history of an applicant until the applicant has been 
deemed qualified for [a] position.”170   
 To help strike a balance, many commentators have developed 
guidelines for all employers to follow to help avoid negligent hiring 
liability. These guidelines include interviewing all applicants, 
diligently checking applicant references, investigating prior 
employment history, and maintaining accurate records of 
investigations.171 
 As far as negligent retention and supervision, the burden on 
employers tends to focus on monitoring employees and taking 
corrective actions when employees behave inappropriately.172 This 
duty is not new and is already in the employer’s interest. As the 
Anicich court noted, employers already have a duty of promptly 
investigating and correcting civil rights violations, such as sexual 
harassment in the workplace.173 In addition, employers presumably 
want their workplaces to be free of harassment and violence. Thus, 
employers already have incentives to take corrective actions that limit 
their liability for negligent retention and supervision claims.  
 A valid concern from employers is that a general duty to 
ensure employees do not pose a danger to others would chill hiring, 
particularly for classes of people who present a special risk. However, 
the limited scope of negligent hiring and retention should not chill the 
                                                 
169 775 ILCS 5/2-103(A).  
170 775 ILCS 75/15(a).  
171 Michael A. Gamboli, Negligent Hiring – Caveat Employer, 44-NOV R.I. 
B.J. 13 (1995); Cathie A Shattuck, The Tort of Negligent Hiring and the Use of 
Selection Devices: The Employee’s Right of Privacy and the Employer’s Need to 
Know, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 2 (1989).  
172 See, e.g., Platson v. NSM, America, Inc., 748 N.E.2d 1278, 1284 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2001). 
173 Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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hiring of protected classes of people or “high-risk” applicants. People 
with physical and mental disabilities, for example, enjoy substantial 
protections in hiring under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 
Illinois Human Rights Act.174 These statutes serve to discourage 
employers from discrimination against disabled individuals. Moreover, 
the statutes only prohibit discrimination against disabled individuals 
who are qualified for the position.175 Employers therefore do not need 
to hire individuals with a physical or mental disability if their 
disability foreseeably poses a danger to third parties. In any event, 
Illinois courts have never found a person’s physical or mental 
disability to qualify as a “particular unfitness” for purposes of 
negligent hiring or retention. As noted above, “particular unfitness” 
typically involves behaviors that exhibit violent or criminal 
tendencies.176  
 Applicants with criminal backgrounds already face significant 
barriers to employment, but potential liability for negligent hiring and 
retention claims should not be an additional one. Illinois courts have 
been reluctant to extrapolate too much from an employee’s criminal 
background, particularly for positions that impose no special duty to 
the public.177 In addition, the proximate cause requirement for 
negligent hiring and retention claims limits employer liability based on 
foreseeability and connection to employment. Thus, the mere fact of a 
criminal background is likely insufficient to satisfy the proximate 
cause element. Rather, the criminal background must show some 
                                                 
174 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 42 U.S.C. § 12112; Illinois Human 
Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/2.  
175 “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the 
basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, [and] hiring.” 42 U.S.C § 
12112(a) (emphasis added); Under the Illinois Human Rights Act, disability is 
defined as a physical or mental characteristic of a person “unrelated to the person's 
ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.” 775 ILCS 5/1-103(I).   
176 See, e.g., Gregor by Gregor v. Kleiser 443 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1982); Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1997).   
177 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Petty Mgmt. Corp., 752 N.E.2d 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001).  
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particular unfitness, and that particular unfitness must pose some 
danger created by the position. 178 For example, an applicant’s prior 
history of sexual misconduct with minors is a particular unfitness that 
poses danger in a position that requires the employee to be alone with 
minors.179 However, this same applicant likely does not pose a danger 
in a position that has limited social interactions and no contact with 
children. Thus, employers need not screen out every applicant with a 
criminal background. Instead, they must evaluate the requirements of 
the position at hand and determine whether the applicant would pose a 
danger in the position in light of the applicant’s particular 
background.180  
 
B. Striking a Proper Balance 
        
 Admittedly, employers must walk a fine line. If employers are 
overzealous in investigating their employees, they face potential 
liability for civil rights violations.181 On the other hand, if they are not 
cautious enough, they face liability under negligent hiring and 
retention, to say nothing of the non-legal consequences associated with 
injuries inflicted on the public and other employees.182Given this 
                                                 
178 See, e.g., Strickland v. Communications and Cable of Chicago, Inc., 710 
N.E.2d 55, 58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
179 See, e.g., Mueller v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 54, 678 N.E.2d 660 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1997).  
180 Shattuck, supra note 171, at 4-5.  
181 See, e.g., Murillo v. City of Chicago, 61 N.E.3d 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) 
(finding a police sergeant’s use of a janitor’s prior arrest record to deny a security 
clearance a violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act).  
182 Not only did Home Depot have to deal with the horrific murder of one of its 
employees, the sensational case was widely reported in local, national, and 
international media outlets, often with Home Depot in the title. See, Jennifer Smith, 
Court backs family’s lawsuit blaming Home Depot for death of pregnant employee, 
21, who was strangled then raped by her supervisor, THE DAILY MAIL (Mar. 28, 
2017); Jonathan Stempel, Home Depot must again face lawsuit over employee’s 
murder – US court, REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2017); Michael Tarm, Court restores 
Plainfield woman’s suit accusing Home Depot of negligence in daughter’s slaying, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 28, 2017).  
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tightrope employers must walk, it is important for courts to apply 
consistent standards with negligent hiring and retention claims. 
Consistent standards can help employers determine how far they need 
to go in both background investigations of applicants and disciplinary 
measures for current employees. Consistent standards could also help 
disadvantaged groups, such as former felons, because employers may 
be less reluctant to hire “risky” employees if they had a clear, 
straightforward understanding of their duties under negligent hiring 
and retention.    
 In many ways, the premises/chattel standard of the 
Restatement of Torts provides this clear standard. Limiting employer 
liability to intentional acts of its employees committed on employer 
premises or using employer chattels limits negligent hiring and 
retention claims to situations that are presumably under the employer’s 
control. After all, the employer is responsible for overseeing what 
happens on its own premises and how its chattels are used. Extending 
liability beyond premises and chattels extends employer liability to 
situations that are further and further removed from the employer’s 
control.   
 In Anicich, however, this standard caused a dilemma. 
Bromfield’s murder happened at a private wedding hundreds of miles 
from where she worked.183 Cooper did not use any of Home Depot’s 
chattels in committing his crime. Yet, there was an inescapable 
connection between Cooper’s employment and Bromfield’s murder. 
Cooper met Bromfield through work. He was her supervisor and 
continued to be her supervisor despite berating her and threatening her 
in full view of other employees. Finally, he used his supervisory 
authority to pressure her to go to the wedding. All of this suggests that 
the murder could not have happened but for Cooper’s employment 
with Home Depot. The premises/chattel standard, therefore, seemed 
unfitting.   
  Certainly, the court felt that attaching liability to Home Depot 
was justified. In a dramatic conclusion to his opinion, Judge Hamilton 
wrote: 
                                                 
183 Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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Every life lost to brutality is unique, each family's hell a 
private one. We do not diminish that truth when we repeat 
that Alisha’s story is an old story that has been told too many 
times. Its ending is both shocking and predictable. Alisha's 
family is entitled to try to prove its truth.184 
   
This quote suggests that the court was perhaps persuaded not only by 
the shocking facts of this case, but also by a desire to create a new 
deterrent for employers. After all, if this horrifying story has been told 
“too many times,” the court was likely inclined to use its power to 
prevent it from being told again, particularly given the fact that the 
case involved a common law tort.    
 But in creating an additional deterrent, the court warped the 
Restatement’s premises/chattel standard. By analogizing supervisory 
authority to chattels, the court paved a new avenue for employer 
liability without establishing any clear limits.185 For example, what 
exactly constitutes abuse of supervisory authority? Would this 
somehow be limited to egregious abuses, such as threatening to cut 
hours or fire an employee? Or would more subtle forms of abuse 
qualify, such as playing favorites among subordinates? One can 
imagine that even subtle forms of abuse could be used to manipulate 
or coerce employees.    
 Next, how exactly does one establish the connection between 
abuse of supervisory authority and the plaintiff’s injury? When an 
injury happens on the employer’s premises or with an employer’s 
chattel, the connection is clear. If an employee strangles a customer in 
the employer’s store, the employee is clearly on the employer’s 
premises. Similarly, if a maintenance worker uses an employer-issued 
key to illegally enter a victim’s apartment, he is using an employer 
chattel. But supervisory authority is much more amorphous. It is not a 
tangible place or object. There are innumerable ways a supervisor can 
abuse authority to manipulate or coerce employees. And there are 
                                                 
184 Id. at 656. 
185 Id. at 654.  
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countless injuries that could flow from this abuse, from bribery or 
extortion to murder. If Illinois were to fully embrace the supervisory 
authority as chattel analogy, employers may face liability for a wide 
range of injuries where they traditionally have not been liable.   
 Instead of extending the Restatement’s premises/chattel 
requirement to include supervisory authority, the court could have 
taken a broader view of the “virtue of employment” standard applied 
by some Illinois courts. As noted above, no Illinois case has found 
negligent hiring or retention liability when an injury did not happen on 
the employer’s premises or using the employer’s chattels. At the same 
time, Illinois courts have never strictly followed the premises/chattel 
requirement of the Restatement. Several Illinois decisions simply used 
a “virtue of employment” standard without invoking the 
Restatement.186 This looser standard could have been extended in the 
Anicich case without warping the premises/chattel requirement of the 
Restatement.  
 Using the “virtue of employment” standard, the court could 
have simply focused on the foreseeability analysis. In Anicich, Cooper 
exhibited some shocking behavior at work which, the court noted, a 
reasonable jury could easily have found would lead to “the small 
further step to violence.”187 Discarding the premises/chattel 
requirement and focusing instead on foreseeability would have had the 
benefit of extending negligent hiring and retention liability in cases 
like Anicich without confining courts to the “formalistic” approach of 
the Restatement. This would provide plaintiffs with a remedy in cases 
like Anicich, where the injury occurred outside the scope of 
employment, but where there is a strong connection to the 
employment relationship.   
 Illinois courts already engage in this foreseeability analysis 
when evaluating proximate cause in negligent hiring and retention 
claims. Extending it a bit would simply require employers to be more 
vigilant when their employees exhibit alarming behaviors. If an 
                                                 
186 See, e.g., Carter v. Skokie Valley Detective Agency, Ltd., 628 N.E.2d 602 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).  
187 Id. at 655.  
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employee exhibits particularly violent behavior, as Cooper did in 
Anicich, employers should bear a heavier burden. They should have a 
stronger duty to take corrective action. And in these situations, liability 
could extend further off-duty as the employee’s on-duty behavior 
becomes more outrageous. On the other hand, if the employee exhibits 
nothing but ordinary behavior, then commits some heinous act, the 
employer would not be liable, perhaps even if the act occurs on the 
employer’s premises or using the employer’s chattels. While certainly 
not a bright-line rule, focusing on foreseeability would serve the dual 
purpose of providing injured third parties a remedy while also 
incentivizing employers to be more vigilant in taking corrective 
actions against their aberrant employees.  
 This approach would not necessarily chill the hiring of “high 
risk” applicants, such as felons or applicants with past criminal 
backgrounds. Assuming a position has limited contact with the public 
and poses no special opportunity for tortious conduct, even applicants 
with serious criminal backgrounds would not create significant 
liability for employers. For example, an employee formerly convicted 
of armed robbery working in a warehouse who exhibits no unusual 
behaviors at work would not create any additional liability if he robs 
one of his coworkers in the parking lot. While the employer may have 
notice of his prior criminal conviction, without anything more it could 
not be reasonably foreseen that he would rob again on the employer’s 
premises. In addition, this hypothetical robbery could not be said to 
have happened by “virtue of employment.” After all, nothing about his 
employment, aside from his mere presence in the parking lot, could be 
said to have created the opportunity for the crime. At the same time, if 
this same employee began exhibiting violent or abusive behavior at 
work, the employer would be on a heightened duty to take corrective 
action. Knowledge of the past criminal conviction combined with the 
threatening on-duty behavior could put the employer on notice, and 
make the employer potentially liable even if the employee commits a 
crime off the employer’s premises and not using the employer’s 
chattels, so long as there is some connection between the crime and 
the fact of employment.  
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 The limiting devices that Illinois courts already have in place 
would prevent this approach from opening the flood gates of employer 
liability. Illinois courts have consistently held that simply knowing 
someone through work is not enough to find employer liability for 
negligent hiring and retention claims.188 The proximate cause analysis 
has always required more. In addition, this approach would only 
expand liability in the relatively few instances where respondeat 
superior would not apply and where civil rights statutes do not 
preempt negligent hiring and retention claims. Thus, taking a broader 
view of foreseeability with the “virtue of employment” standard would 
not greatly expand the scope of employer liability while, at the same 




 Employers are confronted with liabilities from many fronts. 
For employers, negligent hiring and retention may seem to be yet 
another liability which they could face despite all reasonable 
precautions. And, without proper limits on these torts that indeed 
could be the case. However, negligent hiring and retention claims can 
provide an important remedy for plaintiffs who are injured by 
employees the employer should have known were dangerous. Illinois 
case law is rife with examples of plaintiffs who suffered horrific 
injuries that were somehow connected to their employment. 
Unfortunately, Anicich provides yet another such example.  
 For negligent hiring and retention claims to retain their 
viability, courts must apply consistent standards that are just for both 
injured parties and employers. While the Restatement’s 
premises/chattel standard may have created a bright line, cases like 
Anicich reveal the impracticality of its approach. However, the Anicich 
court’s expansion of Restatement standard may prove to be equally 
unworkable. Instead, a broader view of foreseeability with the “virtue 
of employment” standard could help to remedy victims such as 
                                                 
188 Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 4 N.E.3d 550, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
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Bromfield while incentivizing employers to be more vigilant in 
monitoring employees that pose a danger to others. Given the 
numerous limiting principles Illinois courts already place on negligent 
hiring and retention claims, a broader view of foreseeability would 
truly be an “incremental shift” as opposed to the potentially far-
reaching expansion of the Restatement’s doctrine taken by the Seventh 




: Your Supervisor As Your Chattel: Broadening the Scope of Negligen
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017
